Existing Conflict between the Defendant\u27s Right of Confrontation and the Witness\u27 Right to Avoid Self-Incrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma by Luka-Hopson, Diana
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 38 
Issue 1 Fall 1988 Article 10 
1988 
Existing Conflict between the Defendant's Right of Confrontation 
and the Witness' Right to Avoid Self-Incrimination: A 
Constitutional Dilemma 
Diana Luka-Hopson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Diana Luka-Hopson, Existing Conflict between the Defendant's Right of Confrontation and the Witness' 
Right to Avoid Self-Incrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 245 (1989). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/10 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 






In a criminal trial, the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees a defendant's right to confront the
witnesses against him.1 The United States Supreme Court has held this right
to be fundamental to due process of law and a fair trial.2 A defendant exer-
cises the right of confrontation through cross-examination of opposing wit-
nesses.3 The fifth amendment, however, provides the witness with a
privilege to decline to testify in order to avoid self-incrimination. 4 Occasion-
ally, the government seeks to call a witness knowing that the witness will
provide no testimony and will invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.5 The trial court then must decide whether to allow the government to
call such a witness before the jury.
A problem of constitutional dimension arises when the witness asserts his
fifth amendment privilege in the presence of the jury, because the defendant
is then unable to confront, through cross-examination, the inferences arising
from the claim of the privilege.6 The jury is left with the witness' "ambigu-
ous replies" 7 to the government's questions and the powerful but improper
inference as to what the witness' answer might have been in the absence of
1. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1973).
3. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); see also Alford v. United States,
282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARv. L. REV. 567, 579 (1978).
4. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.., without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 61-105, 136-77.
6. United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203, 1208 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1069 (1984) ("[T]he defendant's right to discredit prosecution witnesses on cross-examination
cannot overcome the witness' privilege against self-incrimination .. ") (citing Alford, 282 U.S.
at 694).
7. See generally Comment, Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination by Wit-
nesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the Accused, 33 U. CH1. L. REV. 151, 153 (1965).
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the claim of privilege.8
The Supreme Court has had two opportunities to address the issues aris-
ing out of such forced invocations of the fifth amendment privilege in the
presence of the jury. In Namet v. United States,' the Court recognized two
rationales for holding that the practice of calling a witness to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege in the presence of the jury constitutes reversible error.
The Court recognized first that the practice may require reversal in the case
of "prosecutorial misconduct"-where the government makes a "conscious
and flagrant" attempt to build its case from the improper inferences arising
from the claim of privilege.'° The Court stated that reversal may also be
required if the witness' refusal to answer questions enhances the govern-
ment's case in a manner not subject to cross-examination, thus unfairly prej-
udicing the defendant." Later, in Douglas v. Alabama,12 the Court
addressed the constitutional dimension of the problem and held that when
the "inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the
prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus un-
fairly prejudiced the defendant,"'" calling the witness violated the sixth
amendment right of confrontation.
Within this broad framework of evidentiary and constitutional guidelines,
the federal courts of appeals have struggled with the question of when, if
ever, the government may be allowed to call a witness when it knows that
the witness will invoke the fifth amendment privilege. It is not surprising
that in applying the Namet and Douglas standards, the courts have reached
widely varying conclusions on this issue.
This Comment will identify the standards the federal courts of appeals
have developed to evaluate the appropriateness of allowing the government
to call a witness it knows will invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.
Next, the Comment will analyze this practice in light of prevailing eviden-
tiary and constitutional principles. The Comment will conclude that the
principles involved require that when a witness is called to testify and the
government expects that the witness may invoke his fifth amendment privi-
lege, the court should examine the witness outside the presence of the jury to
determine which, if any, questions the witness will answer. If the court de-
8. See United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
9. 373 U.S. 179 (1963).
10. Id. at 186.
11. Id. at 187. The Court distinguished the occasional inference arising from the assertion
of the fifth amendment privilege, a "minor lapse," from the use of assertion of the privilege as
an important element of the government's case. Id.
12. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
13. Id. at 420 (quoting Namet, 373 U.S. at 187).
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termines that the witness will do nothing more than claim the privilege, the
court should dismiss the witness and disallow any questioning before the
jury.
I. CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONTROVERSY IN THE COURTS
A. The Supreme Court
In Namet v. United States, 14 the Court affirmed the defendant's conviction
despite his two codefendants' repeated invocations of the fifth amendment
privilege in the presence of the jury.15 The United States Attorney charged
the petitioner and his codefendants with violating the federal wagering tax
law, and the defendants pleaded not guilty.' 6 On the day of the trial, the
codefendants changed their pleas to guilty.' 7 The prosecutor, in his opening
statement, remarked that the codefendants, who were husband and wife,
would testify against the defendant. 18 At that time, the defendant's counsel
approached the bench to object to the calling of the codefendants as wit-
nesses.19 The trial court, however, stated that it was uncertain whether the
codefendants could properly assert their claim of privilege after entering a
plea of guilty.2 °
The court allowed the government to call the first codefendant as a wit-
ness. She testified to basic background information, such as her name and
address, and admitted her acquaintance with the defendant.2 However, she
refused to answer whether she or her husband were involved in "some type
of business relationship" with the defendant. 2 The trial court ruled that the
witness' guilty plea deprived her of the right to refuse to testify about the
14. 373 U.S. 179 (1963).
15. Id. at 189-91.
16. Id. at 180. For purposes of this Comment, a codefendant is a person who the govern-
ment has charged together with the defendant, but who is not currently on trial either because
the codefendant has pleaded guilty, the court has severed the trial, or the court has tried the
codefendant.
17. Id. The government subpoenaed the witnesses to testify at Namet's trial because they
had previously provided information to the government regarding their relationship with
Namet. Id.
18. Id. at 180-81.
19. Id. The defendant's attorney argued that the witnesses' guilty pleas did not waive
their constitutional right to avoid self-incrimination, because their testimony could still lead to
indictment on additional federal charges. Id. at 18 1. The same attorney represented both the
defendant and the witnesses. Id. at 180.
20. Id. at 181. The court did not accept the defense's argument and instead determined
that it would rule on the appropriateness of the claims of privilege if and when the witnesses
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gambling activity in question.23 The prosecutor also called the second code-
fendant to the stand.24 The codefendant testified voluntarily on some mat-
ters and on others only upon direction of the court.25 On four questions the
court upheld his refusal to answer.26 The defendant's counsel did not object
to the second codefendant's testimony.27 The jury never learned that the
two codefendants had been arrested and charged with the defendant.2" Fur-
thermore, the court instructed the jury not to draw inferences from the wit-
nesses' refusal to testify on certain matters.29 The jury convicted the
defendant of violating the federal wagering tax laws.30
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error when it allowed the prosecutor to question the two
codefendants knowing that they would claim the fifth amendment privi-
lege.31 The Court, however, disagreed.32 First, the Court found no evidence
of "prosecutorial misconduct," which occurs when the government makes a
''conscious and flagrant" attempt to "build its case out of inferences arising
from the use of the testimonial privilege." 33 Such misconduct, according to
the Court, may warrant reversal.34 Instead, the Court found first that the
prosecutor acted properly in this case and stated that the prosecutor did not
have to accept "at face value" the claim that the witnesses would invoke
their fifth amendment privileges.35 Second, the Court did not find that infer-
ences arising from the witness' claim of the fifth amendment privilege added
"critical weight ... in a form not subject to cross-examination," which the
23. Id. at 182. However, the court recognized that the witness still risked possible prose-
cution on other related charges, and therefore could only provide limited testimony. Id.
24. Id. at 184.
25. Id.
26. Id. The witness refused to answer the following questions: "Can you tell us what
those dealings [the witness' dealings with the [defendant]] were?"; "And were you paid a com-
mission on all the bets you took in your variety store?"; "Who did you accept the bets for that
you took in your variety store?"; and "Did you ever take bets for the defendant David
Namet?" Id. n.3.
27. Id. at 184.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 185. The court instructed the jury not to draw inferences from the witness'
refusal to testify concerning certain matters unless " 'it would be a logical inference that would
appeal to [the jurors] as having a direct bearing upon the defendant's guilt.'" Id.
30. Id. at 180.
31. Id. at 185. The Supreme Court did not find any constitutional issues raised in the
petitioner's argument; instead, the Court focused only on the evidentiary question.
32. Id. at 188.
33. Id. at 186.
34. Id. at 187-88.
35. Id. at 188. Moreover, the Court found independent and proper reasons to call these
witnesses. Id.
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Court recognized could have unfairly prejudiced the defendant. a6 The Court
reasoned that the witnesses' claims of privilege were not the only source of a
possible inference that the witnesses were involved with the defendant in
criminal activity. a7 On the contrary, the witnesses' nonprivileged testimony
already had established that fact.38
In Douglas v. Alabama,39 the Court reviewed a witness' invocation of the
fifth amendment privilege in light of the defendant's sixth amendment con-
frontation clause protection.' In Douglas, the state tried the petitioner and
an alleged accomplice on charges of assault with intent to murder.4" The
jury convicted the accomplice of these charges and the accomplice planned
to appeal. The accomplice's attorney advised his client to claim the fifth
amendment privilege when called to testify at the petitioner's trial.42 The
accomplice's attorney clearly informed the trial court that the accomplice
intended to decline to testify.43 However, the trial court ruled that the con-
victed accomplice could not rely on his fifth amendment privilege because of
his prior conviction.' This ruling forced the accomplice to take the stand.
For the most part, the prosecutor simply read from a document, identified as
the accomplice's confession, and asked the accomplice if the statement was
his.45 One of the passages in the statement identified the defendant as the
person who fired the shotgun and wounded the victim.46 The accomplice
invoked the fifth amendment privilege each time the prosecutor asked a
question, a total of twenty-one times in all.4 7 The prosecutor then called
three police officers to the stand to identify the document as the confession
the accomplice signed.4"
The jury convicted the defendant of assault with intent to murder.4 9 On
appeal, the defendant argued that the "questioning" of the accomplice
36. Id. at 187.
37. Id. at 189. The Court stated that the lengthy testimony that witnesses provided out-
weighed the limited assertions of the fifth amendment privilege. Id.
38. Id.
39. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
40. Id. at 416-18.
41. Id. at 416.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. When the witness still refused to answer the prosecutor's questions, the court
declared the witness to be a "hostile witness" for the government and allowed the prosecutor
to "cross-examine" the witness on the witness' prior statement. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 417. The statement also provided the details of the circumstances leading to the
alleged crime. Id.
47. Id. at 416-17 & n.2.
48. Id. at 417.
49. Id. at 416-17.
1988]
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through the reading of his confession violated the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation.50 The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the
defendant's inability to cross-examine the witness about the statements made
in the confession denied the defendant his right of confrontation.5 The
Court reasoned that the statement provided a "crucial link" in the govern-
ment's case, as evidence that the defendant fired the gun and that he had the
intent to kill.52 In fact, the statement provided the only direct evidence that
the defendant fired the shotgun.5 3 The Court also found the reading of the
confession and the witness' refusal to respond may, to the jury, have been
the equivalent of an admission that the witness made the statement and that
it was true.54 But because of the witness' claim of privilege, cross-examina-
tion was impossible.55 Thus, because the alleged confession was a funda-
mental part of the government's case, the Court concluded that these
"inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the
prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination and thus un-
fairly prejudiced the defendant. ,56
B. The Courts of Appeals
Namet and Douglas provide a foundation for considering the problem of
witnesses' invocations of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and their effect on defendants. Those cases, however, deal with ex-
treme factual situations that make it difficult to discern a general principle.
In Namet, the witnesses provided relevant testimony that outweighed their
occasional claims of privilege.57 The Court noted the defense counsel's par-
tial lack of objection and the fact that the defense did not raise the confron-
tation clause issue.5" In Douglas, by contrast, the witness provided no
50. Id. at 417-18. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), the Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment confrontation clause applies to the states. The Alabama Court of
Appeals, however, affirmed the defendant's conviction because his attorney "stopped ob-
jecting," which the court found to constitute a waiver. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418.
51. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 418.
52. Id. at 419.
53. Id. The statement indicated that Douglas was riding in the backseat of an automobile
with a loaded automatic shotgun and that Douglas rolled down a window and fired the gun at
a passing truck. When asked if he had made such a statement, the witness asserted his fifth
amendment privilege. Id. at 417-18 n.3.
54. Id. at 419.
55. Id. at 419-20. Because the prosecutor who read the statement was not a witness, the
prosecutor obviously could not be cross-examined in any way. The actual witness also could
not be cross-examined because he did not testify or admit to the statements the prosecutor
read. Id.
56. Id. at 420 (citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963)).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
58. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1963).
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testimony of any relevance, and the prosecution's reading of the witness'
prior statement increased the prejudice arising from the defendant's inability
to cross-examine.59 Thus, in considering these issues, the courts of appeals
have been left with fairly broad discretion and have responded by developing
a variety of analytical approaches to address the problem.
1. The Balancing Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explicitly
developed a balancing approach that it uses to weigh the probative value of
the witness' testimony and the government's need for that evidence against
the prejudicial effect of the claims of privilege on the defendant.' This ap-
proach tracks the test used in rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which balances the probative value of certain evidence against the danger of
unfair prejudice arising from the evidence.
61
For example, in United States v. Compton,62 the Sixth Circuit held that
the government may call a witness who the government knows will invoke
the fifth amendment privilege if the government has an "honest belief" that
the witness has relevant information and that such information is admissi-
ble.63 The court cautioned, however, that it would find unfair prejudice if
the government called the witness merely to induce the witness' claim of
privilege in response to irrelevant or inadmissible questions.
64
Consistent with the approach of balancing the interests of the parties, the
Sixth Circuit has stated that a trial court may permit the government to call
a witness who will assert the fifth amendment privilege if the government's
case would be "seriously prejudiced" by the absence of the witness. 65 Such
prejudice could arise if the jury were to question the absence of the witness
and infer that because the government did not call him, his testimony would
have been unfavorable to the government. 66 Even in a case of potential prej-
udice to the government, however, the trial judge, according to the Sixth
Circuit, should "closely scrutinize" the government's request.67 In addition,
the Sixth Circuit will examine the scope of the government's questioning on
59. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 62-77.
61. FED. R. EVID. 403, "Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Con-
fusion, or Waste of Time," provides that relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."
62. 365 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 956 (1966).
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Kilpatrick, 477 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1973).
66. Id.
67. United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1147 (6th Cir. 1980).
1988]
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the grounds that extensive questioning, in the face of repeated invocations of
the privilege, is "obviously unfair."6
United States v. Vandetti69 also illustrates this approach of balancing pro-
bative value and prejudicial effect. In Vandetti, the grand jury indicted the
defendant, along with six codefendants, on charges of conducting an illegal
gambling business.7° At the defendant's trial, the prosecutor called the co-
defendants as witnesses. 7 Although it was clear that they would all invoke
their fifth amendment privileges, the trial court permitted the prosecution to
call the witnesses for the purpose of providing their names and addresses and
thereafter invoking the privilege in response to brief questioning.72
The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded,73 instructing the trial
court to analyze the use of the witnesses under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.74 The court noted that relevant evidence is only presumptively ad-
missible, 75 and stated that if such evidence gives rise to unfair prejudice, the
trial court should consider whether other means are available to bring forth
the same information with less prejudice. 76 Finally, the court recognized
that the probative value of the "testimony"-the assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege-is typically outweighed by the impossibility of cross-
examination.77
2. The Witness' Relationship to the Defendant
In both Namet and Douglas, the witnesses who claimed the fifth amend-
ment privilege were codefendants of the person on trial.78 In Vandetti, the
witnesses also were codefendants who the government tried separately.79 In
68. Id.
69. 623 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 1145.
71. Id. at 1146.
72. Id. The trial judge concluded that because the codefendants were eyewitnesses, their
absence at trial could prejudice the government's case. The codefendants refused to testify,
because of the possibility of future criminal charges and because they had appealed their con-
victions at that time. Id.
73. Id. at 1150.
74. Id. at 1149.
75. Id. The trial court may exclude relevant evidence if the potential for the evidence to
generate unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues substantially outweighs its probative value.
Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 403).
76. Id. " 'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest a deci-
sion on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." Id. (citing
FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note).
77. Id. at 1148 (citing Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971)).
78. See supra note 16 and supra text accompanying notes 28, 41-48.
79. See 623 F.2d at 1145-46.
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some circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has held that the permissibility of calling a witness to the stand to invoke the
privilege turns on the relationship of the proposed witness to the defendant.
One of the first cases in which the court made this distinction was San
Fratello v. United States. 80 In San Fratello, the government sought to call
the defendant's wife as a witness, although the witness had informed the
court that she had claimed her fifth amendment privilege in a previous trial
and would continue to do so." The court nevertheless allowed the prosecu-
tion to call the wife as a witness, and she immediately asserted her privi-
lege. 2 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Fifth Circuit ruled that
because of the husband/wife relationship between the defendant and the wit-
ness, the trial court should not have allowed the prosecution to call the wit-
ness without affirmatively demonstrating that "no injury" to the defendant
would result from such a tactic.83 In reaching this conclusion, the court
drew a distinction between an "ordinary witness," who may be connected to
the defendant through the facts of the case or through a prior relationship,
and a witness with a close relationship to the defendant, such as a spouse or
a codefendant, whose refusal to testify will likely impute guilt to the
defendant.4
Later, in United States v. Ritz,85 the Fifth Circuit followed this reasoning
and reversed the conviction of four family members after the prosecution
required the husband of one defendant and the father of two others to invoke
the fifth amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. 6 In Ritz, however,
the relationship of the witnesses to the defendant, although important, was
only one of several factors leading the court to conclude that the inferences
arising from the claim of privilege added "critical weight" to the govern-
ment's case.
87
Although San Fratello placed the defendant's spouse and the codefendants
on equal footing as "nonordinary" witnesses, courts have generally followed
a "relationship" standard as the test for determining whether or not the
prosecutor should be allowed to call the witness only where familial relation-
ships are involved.8 8 In practice, the prosecution often calls codefendants to
80. 340 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1965).
81. Id. at 562.
82. Id. at 563.
83. Id. at 567.
84. Id. at 565.
85. 548 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1977).
86. Id. at 521.
87. Id. at 519-21.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Demchak, 545 F.2d 1029, 1031 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant's
father). San Fratello, 340 F.2d at 562 (defendant's wife). But see United States v. Jenkins, 442
1988]
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the stand, either because of the belief that the codefendants might testify to
relevant information or because of a concern that the jury will draw an infer-
ence against the prosecution from the fact that they are "missing."
8 9
3. The Number of Questions Asked
The number of questions the prosecutor asks after the invocation of the
fifth amendment privilege often is considered an important factor in analyz-
ing the prejudice to the defendant. In Namet, the trial court sustained the
witnesses' refusal to answer four times;90 in Douglas, the prosecutor forced
the witness to assert the privilege twenty-one times.9
In Sanders v. United States,92 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed a situation in which the government continued to
question a witness who asserted the fifth amendment privilege to fifty-five
questions, only ten of which implicated the defendant. 93 A second witness
also claimed the privilege in response to the government's questions.94 In
reversing the defendant's conviction, the court concluded that the number of
questions asked clearly demonstrated that the improper inferences, which
the defendant was unable to test through cross-examination, added "critical
weight" to the government's case.9 Similarly, in United States v. Coppola,96
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found prejudice to
the defendant where the witness claimed the privilege eighteen times.97 The
court stated that the practice clearly was prejudicial because the number and
variety of questions demonstrated the government's effort to derive eviden-
tiary value from the witness' claim of privilege. 98
In Robbins v. Small, 99 the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction after a witness claimed the privi-
lege to fourteen questions.' ° The court stated that once it becomes appar-
F.2d 429, 436 (5th Cir. 1971) (court rejected relationship standard because the two witnesses
did not directly participate in the commission of the crime).
89. See supra text accompanying note 66; infra text accompanying note 113.
90. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
91. See supra text accompanying note 47.
92. 373 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1967).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 735-36.
96. 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973).
97. Id. at 1159.
98. Id. at 1160-61. The court interpreted Namet as allowing the government to call a
witness to give the witness the opportunity to answer questions but not to deliberately ask
questions to elicit a claim of fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 1160.
99. 371 F.2d 793 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967).
100. Id. at 794.
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ent that the witness will continue to assert the privilege, basic fairness
requires that all questioning immediately stop.'O' Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the questions asked by the prosecutor concerned a statement
that was not offered in evidence and therefore not subject to cross-examina-
tion.' O2 Therefore, inferences arising from the witness' claim of the fifth
amendment privilege "added critical weight to the prosecution's case in a
form not subject to cross-examination. ' 103 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
concluded in Skinner v. Cardwell " that no prejudice to the defendant ex-
isted where a witness claimed the privilege in response to four questions and
the trial judge immediately discontinued questioning.'
0 5
4. The Use of Jury Instructions
In Namet, the Court did not decide whether the petitioner was entitled to
instructions explaining to the jury the witnesses' assertion of the privilege
because the defense made no request for such instructions. "°  The Court
noted that the instruction that the trial court gave was not "plain error. '
Accordingly, the issue of the jury instruction did not warrant reversal under
rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.10 In Douglas, the
Court did not discuss the use of a jury instruction." In the courts of ap-
peals, however, the availability and use of appropriate jury instructions has
become a crucial factor in the review of forced invocations of the fifth
amendment privilege in the presence of the jury.
At least one circuit has suggested that the government should request an
appropriate instruction instead of calling a witness to the stand to invoke the
fifth amendment privilege in the jury's presence. In Bowles v. United
States, "o the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit stated that the jury is not entitled to rely on any inferences that it
may draw from a witness' decision to invoke the fifth amendment privi-
101. Id. at 795. The court noted that in this case the prosecutor continued to question the
witness although the prosecutor "knew or certainly should have known that the witness
would" continue to invoke the fifth amendment privilege. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 564 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978).
105. Id. at 1389-90.
106. 373 U.S. 179, 190 (1963).
107. Id. at 190-91.
108. Id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which
does not affect substantive rights shall be disregarded." Id.
109. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
110. 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
1988]
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lege.i" Therefore, the court held that no valid purpose exists in informing
the jury of a witness' decision to invoke the privilege.' 12 The government,
however, frequently has argued that it must call the witness in the jury's
presence, lest the jury infer from the witness' absence that the witness' testi-
mony would not be favorable to the government. '1 3 Thus, in Bowles, the
court stated that if the government is concerned that the jury will draw an
improper inference from the witness' absence, the court should provide an
appropriate instruction to negate that inference.' 
1 4
The courts have also addressed the issue of whether an appropriate jury
instruction can "cure" the prejudice that occurs once a witness has invoked
the privilege in the presence of the jury. In United States v. King, 15 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that cautionary
instructions to the jury are insufficient when viewed in terms of the prejudice
to the defendant." 6 Similarly, in Robbins v. Small, , 7 the First Circuit con-
cluded that jury instructions were insufficient protection against the preju-
dice arising from forced invocations of the privilege against self-
incrimination in the jury's presence. 18
Rather than giving a specific jury instruction, a trial judge sometimes will
comment that a witness is unable to testify on constitutional grounds." 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that this prac-
tice constituted a denial of due process where the only effect of the instruc-
tion was to remind the jury of the fifth amendment privilege.' 20 By contrast,
where the trial judge simply informed the jury that the witness would dis-
continue testifying' 2 ' after the witness claimed the privilege, and the judge
later instructed the jury to disregard the testimony, the reviewing court
found no prejudice.' 22 The Fifth Circuit held that the consideration of the
111. Id. at 541. Otherwise, the jury may draw improper inferences from the privilege,
which will have a "disproportionate impact" on their deliberations. Id.
112. Id. at 542.
113. See Comment, supra note 7, at 155 n.10.
114. 439 F.2d at 542.
115. 461 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1972).
116. Id. at 57 n.4. The court did not consider cautionary instructions to the jury to be
"sufficient protection to overcome the prejudicial harm created by the government... in the
first place." Id.
117. 371 F.2d 793 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967).
118. Id. at 796 ("We would be closing our eyes to reality were we to find that the court's
charge cured the prejudice that resulted .... ").
119. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fournier v. Pinto, 408 F.2d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1969).
120. Id. at 541 (impropriety of calling witness and judge's reference to witness "reinforced"
or "sanctioned" the prejudicial effect).
121. United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir. 1983).
122. Id. at 819 (quoting United States v. Irwin, 661 F.2d 1063, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 907 (1982)) (citing the Fifth Circuit's general rule that "[a]n instruction to
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merits and effects of the claim of privilege was within the trial court's
discretion. 1
23
Jury instructions may also have substantial impact on the analysis under
the "critical weight" standard. For example, in United States v. Lizza Indus-
tries, 124 where the court carefully instructed the jury not to consider the
claim of privilege of a witness against the defendant, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the trial court did not
commit reversible error. 125 Courts often reason that the instruction not to
draw inferences against the defendant from the witness' assertion of the priv-
ilege must be sufficient to protect the defendant's rights because the govern-
ment is entitled to call a witness when the witness possesses relevant
information.1 26 Similarly, an appropriate jury instruction also may contrib-
ute to a finding of harmless error.127 For example, in United States v. Ka-
minski, 121 the Eighth Circuit found the prosecution's questions improper,
but concluded that the error was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant rever-
sal in light of the jury instruction.' 29
5. The Prosecutor's Conduct
Namet and Douglas established that prosecutorial conduct-the govern-
ment's "use" of the improper inferences arising from the claims of privi-
lege-is an important factor in determining the harm to the defendant.
130
disregard ... is sufficient, unless the remark is so prejudicial that it is incurable by the court's
admonition").
123. Id.
124. 775 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986).
125. Id. at 497. The court reasoned that the jury understood the circumstances under
which the witness was testifying. Id.
126. See United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664, 669 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968
(1958).
127. See Mayes v. Sowders, 621 F.2d 850, 853 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922
(1980) (trial court gave cautionary instructions to the jury not to consider unanswered ques-
tions as evidence; the court of appeals found harmless error in allowing the witness' assertion
of the fifth amendment privilege). But see United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 884 (9th Cir.
1980) (court's failure to give a curative instruction following a witness' repeated assertions of
the fifth amendment privilege constituted harmless error).
128. 692 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 515. The court was troubled by improper examination of the witness, but the
court nevertheless concluded that, under the Namet analysis, the defendant was not denied the
right to a fair trial. Id. at 514-15.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35, 51-56. The American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice provide that a prosecutor should not knowingly place a witness
on the stand solely for the purpose of claiming the fifth amendment privilege. STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-5.7(c) (1980). Instead, the comments accompanying the stan-
dards recommend that once the witness informs the prosecutor that the witness will claim the
privilege, the trial judge should rule on the privilege outside the jury's presence. Id. commen-
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Namet recognized "prosecutorial misconduct" as a "conscious and flagrant"
attempt to build the government's case out of improper inferences.' 3I In
Douglas, the prosecutor's reading of the alleged confession of the witness
constituted a substantial error requiring reversal.' 32 This conduct led the
Court to conclude that the inferences derived from the invocation of the
privilege added "critical weight" to the government's case. 133
Prior to the Namet and Douglas decisions, the Second Circuit recognized
in United States v. Maloney 134 that when a witness claims the fifth amend-
ment privilege, a natural inference arises as to what the answer would have
been. 135  In Maloney, the prosecutor called and questioned a witness
although he knew that the witness would claim the privilege.136 The prose-
cutor also referred to the witness' claim of privilege in his closing argu-
ment. 37 The court concluded that permitting this practice was reversible
error. 1
38
By contrast, in Gladden v. Frazier 13  the Ninth Circuit's focus on
prosecutorial conduct led it to conclude that the trial court committed no
reversible error." ° In Gladden, the prosecutor's opening statement, identi-
fied a codefendant as a testifying witness.' 4 ' The defense immediately
moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.' 2 The prosecutor called
the codefendant to the stand, where the codefendant invoked his fifth
amendment privilege.' 4 3 The defense renewed its motion for a mistrial,
which the trial court again denied."' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated
tary at § 3.86. This is consistent with the general guidelines provided in the National Prosecu-
tion Standards, one of which provides that questioning of a witness should be "conducted
fairly, objectively, and with due regard for the dignity and legitimate privacy of the witness."
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 17.6 (National District Attorneys Association 1979).
The commentary to this standard explains that, although the scope of proper questioning of a
witness is within the trial court's discretion, id. commentary at 248, the prosecutor should
make a "good faith quest for the ascertainment of truth." Id. commentary at 249.
131. See Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 186 (1963).
132. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965).
133. Id. at 420 (citing Namet, 373 U.S. at 187).
134. 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959).
135. Id. at 537. The court stated that "[s]uch refusals [to testify] have been uniformly held
not to be a permissible basis for inferring what would have been the answer, although logically




139. 388 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
140. Id. at 780-81.
141. Id. at 778.
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that the controlling factors in its determination were the good faith of the
prosecutor in making the opening statement and the likelihood of prejudice
to the defendant resulting from the statement. 4 In considering the facts of
the case, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct. 4  The Sixth Circuit
followed a similar analysis in United States v. Compton, 147 in which the
court upheld the use of a forced claim of privilege before the jury in circum-
stances where the government had an honest belief that the witness had rele-
vant information concerning the case. 148
Good faith was also crucial in United States v. Quinn. 141 In Quinn, the
witness informed the prosecutor that if called to testify, he would invoke his
fifth amendment privilege unless the government provided him with immu-
nity.'5° Nevertheless, the government called the witness to testify and the
witness invoked the privilege as promised. 5' The Eighth Circuit examined
the prosecutor's motives and the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant.' 52
Despite the court's conclusion that the witness should have asserted the
privilege outside the presence of the jury, the court found neither
prosecutorial misconduct nor prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal.'
53
In other cases, courts have looked to the prosecutor's conduct as a con-
tributing factor when determining whether improper inferences added "criti-
cal weight" to the government's case. In Cota v. Eyman, ' 5 4 the trial court
allowed the prosecutor to call an accomplice to the witness stand knowing
that the witness would claim the fifth amendment privilege.' 55 The witness
claimed the privilege and the prosecutor reminded the jury of that claim in
145. Id. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court did not find the prose-
cutor's good faith controlling, but agreed with the Ninth Circuit's factual determination of the
case, finding neither prosecutorial misconduct nor violation of the right of confrontation. Fra-
zier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 736 (1969).
146. Gladden, 388 F.2d at 780-81.
147. 365 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 956 (1966).
148. Id. at 5.
149. 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976).
150. Id. at 649. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) authorizes the government to compel a witness to
testify by granting immunity to that witness. See generally Note, Federal Witness Immunity
Problems and Practices Under 18 US.C. §§ 6002-6003, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275 (1976).
151. Quinn, 543 F.2d at 649.
152. Id. at 650 & n.6. The court found that the prosecutor intended to grant immunity and
that the witness' full testimony was crucial to the government's case. Id. at 650 n.6. It also
concluded that because the courts must decide each case on its own facts, the trial judge had
broad discretion in determining whether to allow a witness to assert the fifth amendment in the
jury's presence. Id. at 650.
153. Id. at 650-52.
154. 453 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
155. Id. at 693. The witness informed the court outside the jury's presence that he would
invoke the fifth amendment privilege if called to testify. Nevertheless, the court allowed the
prosecutor to call this witness. Id.
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the prosecutor's closing argument. 5 6 Although the Ninth Circuit found the
practice "troubling," it found no "flagrant impropriety" as had existed in
Douglas. 157 Therefore, the court concluded that the practice did not add
"critical weight" to the government's case.'
A court may find sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal where the prose-
cution insists on using the witness' assertion of the fifth amendment privilege
in a manner that adds "critical weight" to the prosecution's case. In
Fletcher v. United States, 1 9 the witness informed the prosecutor and the
court that the witness would refuse to testify and would claim the fifth
amendment privilege if called."6 The government argued that the witness
could not validly claim the privilege, and the court allowed the prosecutor to
question the witness. 6 ' The District of Columbia Circuit found prejudice to
the defendant' 6 2 in the prosecutor's questioning because each question asked
concerned an alleged offense that provided principal support for the govern-
ment's case. 163 The court stated that the claim of privilege in response to
these questions was a "major feature of the proceeding."'
16 4
In Robbins v. Small, 165 the prosecutor legitimately believed that a witness
would testify. 166 The witness, however, claimed the fifth amendment privi-
lege fourteen times when questioned. 6 7 The First Circuit concluded that
once it becomes apparent that a witness will broadly claim the privilege, the
prosecutor must discontinue the questioning.' 68 In Robbins, the court deter-
mined that the prosecutor's questions focused the jury's attention on a state-
ment not offered in evidence. 169 As a result, the defendant was unable to
cross-examine the witness because the witness did not admit that the state-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 694.
158. Id. at 695.
159. 332 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
160. Id. at 725.
161. Id. at 726. The prosecutor argued that the witness could not assert the privilege be-
cause a jury had convicted the witness of the crime in question. Id. at 725.
162. Id. at 727.
163. Id. at 726. Thus, the court distinguished this practice from the occasional invocations
of the fifth amendment privilege in Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963).
164. Fletcher, 332 F.2d at 726.
165. 371 F.2d 793 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967).
166. Id. at 795. The witness signed a statement implicating the defendant in the crime. Id.
167. Id. at 794.
168. Id. at 795. Although the witness' statement led the prosecutor to believe that the
witness would supply evidence against the defendant, the court found that the prosecutor tried
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ment was his. 7' The court found that the prosecutor's conduct added "crit-
ical weight to the prosecution's case." '17 1
In United States v. Coppola, 72 the witness notified the prosecutor that,
despite the witness' prior cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the witness would refuse to testify.1 73 At trial, the prosecutor forced
the witness to invoke the fifth amendment privilege in the jury's presence
eighteen times before the judge ruled that further questioning would be im-
proper. 174 Nevertheless, even after the judge made his ruling, the prosecutor
asked two additional questions. 175 The prosecutor also used the claims of
privilege in his closing argument.176 The Tenth Circuit considered this con-
duct sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.
1 77
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The Supreme Court established broad guidelines for responding to forced
invocations of the fifth amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. The
courts of appeals, however, continue to struggle with the application of these
guidelines in particular cases, leading to inconsistent and often unsatisfying
results. Lacking a clear standard, the courts of appeals have adopted various
overlapping approaches that attempt to reconcile the tension between the
rights of the witness, the rights of the defendant, and the legitimate interests
of the government. 178 The outcome of a particular decision often depends
on the particular factors upon which the courts focus and, in a broader
sense, whether the courts analyze the problem as an evidentiary or a consti-
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)).
172. 479 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1973).
173. Id. at 1159.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1160. The court concluded that neither the prosecutor nor the defense counsel
should comment in his closing arguments about a witness' assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege. Id. at 1161.
177. Id. The court found this conduct invalid and prejudicial because the number and
variety of questions showed that the government was trying to gain evidentiary value from the
claim of privilege. Id. at 1160.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 60-177 (discussing the courts of appeals' responses
to the controversy). The Supreme Court recently declined to review the standards the courts
of appeals have used to determine the appropriateness of the government calling a witness for
the sole purpose of invoking the fifth amendment privilege in the presence of the jury. Lindsey
v. United States, No. 86-5379 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1987), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 310 (1987).
Justices White and Brennan, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, argued that the split in
the circuits regarding the treatment of this issue warranted review by the Court. Lindsey v,
United States, 108 S. Ct. 310, 311 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari),
denying cert. to, No. 86-5379 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1987).
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tutional one.
179
Each court must decide, in a fact-specific context, the question of whether
the forced invocation of the fifth amendment privilege before the jury re-
quires reversal. However, there are several recurring principles that the
courts may properly use to develop some general rules in this area.
A. Evidentiary Considerations
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide basic guidance on the admissibility
of a witness' assertion of the fifth amendment at trial.'1° Rule 403 requires
the court to balance the probative value of any testimony against its prejudi-
cial effect on the defendant.18' This approach to the witness' assertion of the
fifth amendment privilege, which the Sixth Circuit follows explicitly, grants
broad discretion to the trial judge.
1 82
Forcing a witness simply to assert his fifth amendment privilege in the
jury's presence can never give rise to testimony of legitimate probative value.
The only value of such a procedure, in the absence of any actual testimony,
is to strengthen the prosecution's case in the eyes of the jury through the
inference of guilt that arises from the invocation of the privilege. 8 3 The
prejudice arising from these inferences is heightened if the prosecutor, inten-
tionally or otherwise, attempts to establish some link between the witness'
refusal to testify and the defendant's guilt.' 84 This practice can only invite
the jury to draw improper conclusions from the inferences.'
8 5
Prejudice to the defendant always arises from inferences drawn from the
invocation of the fifth amendment privilege because the defendant is unable
to cross-examine the witness about the witness' "ambiguous replies."' 86
Rather than recognizing that the situation always invites prejudice and lacks
legitimate probative value, however, courts often admit that the prejudice
exists and simply focus on whether the prejudice is sufficient to require re-
versal. 18 7 Thus, rather than questioning the practice directly, the courts
179. See infra text accompanying notes 180-99. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 185
(1963), focused on the evidentiary value of the fifth amendment privilege, while Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965), focused on the constitutional issues.
180. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 60-77.
183. See Comment, supra note 7, at 153.
184. Id.
185. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955
(1971).
186. Comment, supra note 7, at 153.
187. See United States v. Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505, 515 (8th Cir. 1982) (error not of suffi-
cient magnitude to warrant reversal); Mayes v. Sowders, 621 F.2d 850, 856 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v.
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look to the jury instructions, the good faith of the prosecutor, or the number
of questions the prosecutor asks to determine the extent of the prejudice and
to determine whether it has been cured.188
This is not to say that a focus on the evidentiary value of the practice is
inappropriate. Indeed, the Namet decision arose in the context of the
Supreme Court's treatment of the witness' invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege as an evidentiary question,"' although Congress had not enacted
the Federal Rules of Evidence at the time of the decision. 190 However,
Namet can only be understood as a reflection of the Court's focus on the
evidentiary aspects of the question without consideration of the important
issue of the defendant's right of cross-examination.' 9
B. Constitutional Considerations
The sixth amendment to the Constitution guarantees the defendant the
right to confront the witnesses against him.192 When a witness asserts the
fifth amendment privilege, a defendant is unable to exercise his sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation through cross-examination.193 Douglas makes
clear that the confrontation clause requirement is not satisfied by the mere
presence of the witness in the courtroom, but rather by the availability of the
witness for cross-examination.' 94 This situation is exacerbated when the
witness provides no relevant testimony on which the defense can cross-ex-
amine the witness, but instead repeatedly asserts the fifth amendment privi-
lege in response to the prosecution's questions.' 95
In the absence of actual testimony, the only purpose of placing a witness
on the stand to assert his fifth amendment privilege is to create inferences of
guilt that the prosecution can use against the defendant. 96 If these infer-
Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1980) (no reversible error because questioning con-
cerned collateral issues); Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1977) (brevity of
questions led to conclusion that no unfair prejudice occurred), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009
(1978); Cota v. Eyman, 453 F.2d 691, 694-95 (9th Cir. 1971) (no error because practice did not
add critical weight to government's case), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 90-177.
189. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1963); see also Robbins v. Small, 371
F.2d 793, 796 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967); Comment, supra note 7, at 160.
190. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat.
1926, 1926 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1982)).
191. Robbins, 371 F.2d at 796; Comment, supra note 7, at 160.
192. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
194. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965); see also S. SINGER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK 716 (1986).
195. See, e.g., Douglas, 380 U.S. 416-17.
196. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2272 (McNaughton
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ences are in fact contributing to the case against the defendant, it follows
that the defendant's inability to challenge these inferences infringes his right
to confrontation. 
197
Courts sometimes view jury instructions as "curing" any prejudice to the
defendant. 9 8 However, the Supreme Court has held that jury instructions
are not an adequate substitute for the constitutional guarantee of confronta-
tion.1 99 Therefore, in the absence of any substantial testimony from the wit-
ness, the prejudice to the defendant's constitutionally protected interest
would seem to outweigh the government's minimal or nonexistent interest in
placing the witness on the stand to invoke his fifth amendment privilege in
the presence of the jury.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: RECONCILING CONFLICTING EVIDENTIARY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Courts should clarify the extent to which the prosecution may use the
forced invocation of the fifth amendment privilege in the jury's presence
within the framework of the Namet and Douglas decisions. The issue is
when, if ever, the government may call a witness knowing that the witness
will assert the fifth amendment privilege and refuse to testify. In addressing
this issue, courts must recognize the tension between the rights of the wit-
ness, the rights of the defendant, and the legitimate interests of the
government.
To establish a uniform test for addressing these issues, courts should
adopt a procedure that recognizes both the evidentiary standards applied in
Namet 2  and the constitutional standards applied in Douglas. 201 At a mini-
mum, courts should adopt a bright-line test to distinguish those witnesses
who provide some relevant testimony (with an occasional claim of privilege)
ed. 1961) ("The layman's natural first suggestion would probably be that the resort to the
privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime.").
197. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
995 (1971); Robbins v. Small, 371 F.2d 793, 795 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967);
Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Maloney, 262
F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
198. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. But see Marcotte, The Jury Will Disre-
gard, 73 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, at 34 (ABA study finds that all information presented at trial
affects jury deliberations despite admonitions to disregard certain evidence).
199. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (discussing jury instructions to
disregard hearsay in joint trial and concluding that jury instructions are not a substitute for
cross-examination); see also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1940) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to
the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.").
200. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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from those witnesses who will do nothing more than assert the claim of priv-
ilege to any substantive question. This procedure is outlined below in the
context of the relevant interests at stake.
A. The Rights of the Witness
The fifth amendment provides a witness with a privilege to decline to tes-
tify on matters on which he may incriminate himself.2" 2 In ordinary circum-
stances, when a witness asserts the privilege, the trial court must determine
whether the claim of privilege is legitimate and whether a narrower privilege
is available to protect the witness.20 3 In making this determination, the
court must consider whether a real danger of self-incrimination exists2" be-
cause harm would result 20 5 to the witness if he provided an answer to the
question asked.
Courts have developed procedures to determine the validity of a claim of
the privilege against self-incrimination. The best procedure, although one
not always used, is for the court to examine the witness outside the presence
of the jury to determine the validity of the witness' claim of privilege and to
determine which, if any, of the government's questions the witness will an-
swer.21 When courts follow this procedure, they place themselves in a posi-
tion to properly determine whether a witness will provide probative
testimony or merely claim the privilege if called to testify.
207
B. The Rights of the Defendant
Once the trial court makes this initial determination of the validity of the
claim of privilege and the value of the proposed testimony, the right of the
defendant to cross-examine the witness is appropriately protected. If the
trial court determines that the witness will provide no relevant testimony,
protection of the defendant's constitutional rights requires that the court dis-
202. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. However, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982) autho-
rizes the government to compel a witness to testify by granting immunity to that witness.
203. See United States v. Thornton, 733 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
204. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951); see also Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) ("substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of
incrimination").
205. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
206. The courts followed this procedure in Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528, 530 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986); United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1239 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974); United States v. Jenkins, 442 F.2d 429, 435-36 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974); Cota v. Eyman, 453 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); United States v. Beye, 445 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1971);
Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Comment, supra note 7,
at 157.
207. Comment, supra note 7, at 157.
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miss the witness and not require the witness to assert the privilege in the
presence of the jury.208 This is so because the defendant cannot exercise his
sixth amendment right to cross-examine the witness when the witness does
nothing more than claim the fifth amendment privilege. 21 Under such cir-
cumstances, if the court requires the witness to claim the privilege in the
presence of the jury, there is a distinct possibility that the witness' claim of
privilege will give rise to inferences against the defendant, which necessarily
add some weight to the government's case in a form not subject to cross-
examination.21o
Furthermore, the procedure proposed above protects the evidentiary in-
terests outlined in Namet.2"1 If the trial court determines that the witness
may properly assert the privilege to some questions, but nevertheless may
provide some probative testimony, the court is in a position to balance the
probative value of the testimony against any potential prejudice to the de-
fendant.212 Thus, use of this procedure would avoid the unnecessary and
prejudicial practice of placing the witness on the stand solely for the purpose
of invoking the fifth amendment privilege.
Of course, courts may still consider, both at trial and on appeal, all of the
factors currently relied upon, including the relationship between the witness
and the defendant,21a the number of questions asked,214 the jury instruc-
tions,215 and the prosecutor's conduct, 216 in determining whether the proba-
tive value of the testimony outweighs its prejudice. However, in making this
determination, courts must emphasize the most important factor indicative
of potential prejudice, impingement of the defendant's right to cross-examine
the witness.217
208. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness
and the truth of his testimony are tested.").
209. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Carlson, Argument to the Jury and
the Constitutional Right of Confrontation, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 293, 299 (1973) (the confrontation
clause guarantees were enacted as a reaction to a practice of trying defendants on ex parte
affidavits or depositions that did not allow the defendant to effectively challenge the statements
made against him).
210. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
211. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 189-91 (1963); see also supra notes 189-91 and
accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text; 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 403-13 (1986) (process of balancing probative value against prejudice con-
stitutes "search for truth").
213. See supra text accompanying notes 78-89.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 90-105.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 106-29.
216. See supra notes 130-77 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. See generally R. McNAMARA, CON-
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C. The Interests of the Government
This suggested procedure protects the government's interest in presenting
its case because the trial court weighs the probative value of the proposed
testimony and the possible unfair prejudice to the defendant.2"' Thus, if the
witness has probative testimony to provide, the court and the jury can re-
ceive that testimony. If the witness will not provide such testimony, or if the
court concludes that the prejudice to the defendant outweighs the probative
value of such testimony, then excluding the witness deprives the government
of no legitimate advantage. Although the government has the right to place
a witness under oath to test his assertion that he will claim the privilege, the
exercise of that right does not require that the government undertake that
test in the presence of the jury.219
If the government is not permitted to call a witness, the jury may notice
the witness' absence and infer that the witness' testimony would have fa-
vored the defendant. 220 Although this is a legitimate concern, it does not
justify permitting the government to call a witness if he will do nothing more
than invoke his fifth amendment privilege in the presence of the jury.22' In-
stead, if appropriate, the court should simply instruct the jury that the wit-
ness is "unavailable" to testify and that the jury should draw no inferences
from either party's failure to call the witness.222 With this instruction, both
the government and the defendant are protected from the inferences drawn
from a "missing" witness, without abridging the defendant's constitutional
rights.22 3
STITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 201-08 (1982); Westen, supra note 3,
at 579 (cross-examination protects the sixth amendment right).
218. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. The proposal would conform to rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which balances the probative value of the testimony against its
prejudicial effect. FED. R. EvID. 403.
219. See San Fratello v. United States, 540 F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1965).
220. See United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1147 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664, 669 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
221. See United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1053 (1974) (neither the government nor the defendant should benefit from inferences arising
from the witness' testimonial privilege) (citing United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211
(1st Cir. 1973)).
222. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (suggesting that
courts give a "neutralizing instruction" to explain and eliminate inferences that might arise
from failure to call a witness; however, court stated that "no valid purpose" exists in informing
jury that witness claimed fifth amendment privilege because jury cannot consider privilege as
evidence in reaching verdict), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971); Maloney, 262 F.2d at 537-38.
223. Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542. In contrast, the standard "missing witness" instruction used
by the courts invites the inference from the failure to call a witness:
You have heard evidence about a witness who has not been called to testify. The
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Namet and Douglas, the Supreme Court established broad guidelines
for trial courts to follow when determining the permissibility of a witness'
forced invocation of the fifth amendment privilege in the presence of the
jury. The federal courts of appeals, however, continue to struggle with the
questions of when, if ever, to allow the government to call a witness when it
knows that the witness will invoke the fifth amendment and when, if ever,
such a practice constitutes reversible error. Because of the lack of clear stan-
dards, courts have reached inconsistent and widely varying conclusions on
these issues.
The constitutional principle involved, the defendant's sixth amendment
guarantee of confrontation through cross-examination, is sufficiently impor-
tant to justify a clarification of the Namet and Douglas standards. When the
government calls a witness to testify, and the witness informs the court of his
intention to invoke his fifth amendment privilege, the court should examine
the witness outside the presence of the jury to determine the validity and
scope of the claim of privilege. If the court determines that the witness will
do nothing more than invoke the privilege, the court should dismiss the wit-
ness without allowing questioning in the presence of the jury. However, if
the court determines that the witness will provide some relevant testimony,
the court should balance the probative value of that testimony against the
prejudicial effect of the witness' claim of privilege to some questions. Of
course, the court should be particularly sensitive to claims of prejudice aris-
ing out of the defendant's inability to exercise his constitutional right to
cross-examine the witness. If the court determines that the witness cannot
testify, the court should protect the government's legitimate interests by in-
structing the jury that the proposed witness is unavailable.
By requiring trial courts to follow this suggested procedure, the courts of
appeals will provide necessary protection to constitutional rights without
hampering legitimate prosecutorial interests in presenting the best possible
defense has argued that the witness could have given material testimony in this case
and the government was in the best position to produce this witness.
If you find that this uncalled witness could have been called by the government
and would have given important new testimony, and that the government was in the
best position to call him, but failed to do so, you are permitted, but you are not
required, to infer that the testimony of the uncalled witness would have been unfa-
vorable to the government.
In deciding whether to draw an inference that the uncalled witness would have
testified unfavorably to the government, you may consider whether the witness' testi-
mony would have merely repeated other testimony and evidence already before you.
1 L. SAND, J. SIFFERT, W. LOUGHLIN & S. REISS, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
6.04 (1987).
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case. Courts also will avoid the uncertainty and conflicts that unnecessarily
surround this area of the law by imposing a rule that will avoid prejudice to
the defendant before it occurs.
Diana Luka-Hopson

